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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the Centre 
for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to carry out 
research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and vulnerability is 
exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms one element in a 
broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide the full documentation 
of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not confirmed. It also aims to 
analyse the processes through which such impacts occur and the circumstances which 
exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a practical policy-oriented purpose and 
concludes with programming and policy recommendations to donor government 
agencies. 
 
This mini report on Northeast India is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies are 
available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This research draws upon secondary data sources 
including existing research studies, reports and evaluations. As DFID does not have any 
direct development engagement in Northeast India, this report does give any direct 
programming or policy recommendations. However, it does highlight key issues which 
need to be addressed for armed violence to be reduced in the region. The authors would 
like to thank David Seddon for comments made on an earlier draft. The analysis and 
opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent 
the views or policy of DFID or the UK government. 
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Acronyms 
 
ANVC Achik National Volunteers Council  
 
AFSP Armed Forces Special Powers Act  
 
ATTF All Tripura Tiger Force  
 
BLFT Bodo Liberation Tigers Force 
 
BNLF Bru National Liberation Front  
 
GOI Government of India 
 
GPMG General-purpose machine gun 
 
HPC-D Hmar People’s Convention – Democrats  
 
HuM Harkat-ul-Mujahideen 
 
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence agency  
 
KNA Kuki National Army 
 
KNF Kuki National Front 
 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
 
MNF Mizo National Front  
 
MULFA Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam  
 
MULTA Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam  
 
NDFB National Democratic Front of Bodoland  
 
NEI Northeast India 
 
NLFT National Liberation Front of Tripura  
 
NNC Nagaland National Council  
 
NSCN National Socialist Council of Nagaland  
 
NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang 
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NSCN-IM National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah 
 
PLA  People’s Liberation Army (Manipur) 
 
POTA Prevention of Terrorism Act  
 
SALW Small arms and light weapons 
 
USCR United States Council for Refugees 
 
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam 
 
ULFSS United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters 
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Executive summary 
 
The seven states of Northeast India (NEI) – Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura – have witnessed a large number of conflicts 
for over five decades. These have been fuelled by a number of issues: land distribution, 
immigration, ethnicity, religion, and political autonomy. More than half a million people 
have lost their lives to insurgency in the area since Indian independence in 1947. Since 
the 1990s there has been a proliferation of insurgent groups representing various tribes 
and ethnic communities. There are currently 72 insurgent groups in NEI. 
 
The context of armed violence 
Geographically isolated from “mainland” India and economically underdeveloped, NEI is 
home to around 220 indigenous groups and over 160 “scheduled tribes”. Throughout the 
20th century, these societies have been going through a process of transition from shifting 
cultivation to settled agriculture, from clan control of land to commodification of land, 
urbanisation and cultural change. This has attracted large-scale immigration, particularly 
from Bangladesh. However, a system of “protective discrimination” restricts the access of 
“non-tribals” to land ownership, business and trading licenses and access to elected 
office. An unintended consequence of this system is that there is a perception that 
scheduled tribes who have a “homeland” have managed to insulate themselves against 
these changes. Thus a “homeland” has become something to which all ethnic groups 
aspire. However, given the ethnic patchwork quilt of some regions, such an aspiration has 
fuelled tribal insurgent groups to use brutal tactics to forcibly displace “unwanted” 
groups thus allowing land for a homeland. This means that in addition to the wars being 
waged against the Government of India (GOI) and the regional states by insurgents 
groups, there are also conflicts within the various communities. 
 
The parties to the violence 
The parties to the violence are the GOI, the regional states, and a plethora of secessionist 
groups. The first armed insurgencies of the Nagas, Mizos and Manipuris were later 
supplemented with secessionist groups fighting for tribal rights throughout NEI. The 
proliferation of state structures in the region over the past 30 years was one of the 
strategies used by the GOI to try to foster stakeholders in the Indian Union. However, this 
federalism is largely cosmetic given the existence of a de facto structure of government 
that manages counterinsurgency operations and is directly controlled by the home 
ministry in New Delhi. The GOI alternates between political pacification and 
development interventions and military cleansing of areas. The Armed Forces Special 
Powers Act (AFSPA), which gives the security forces excessive powers including shoot 
to kill, and the huge deployment of security forces has helped foster a culture of violence 
and impunity. The use of collective punishment techniques, human rights abuses and the 
fact that all power lies with the military apparatus has further alienated NE Indians from 
“mainland” India. This militarization is a huge obstacle to peace in the region. 
 
The role of small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
According to many writers, the proliferation of armed groups is being fuelled by the easy 
availability of SALW. This easy availability helps to escalate social tensions into armed 
conflict, helps to reduce the timescale between setting up a group and it becoming a full-
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scale guerrilla group making a political impact, and helps to fuel a growing network 
between insurgent groups. There are no figures on gun possession in NEI, however, there 
are an estimated 63 million firearms in South Asia. Many of the insurgent groups, fuelled 
by funds from extortion and trafficking, have more modern arms and equipment than the 
state police. This has assisted them in criminal activities such as extortion, allowed them 
to kill with impunity, and helped them to dominate the political arena.  Insurgent groups 
gain SALW from a number of sources: arms left over from the conflict in Cambodia and 
the arming of the mujahideen in Afghanistan; arms from other South Asian insurgent 
groups; China, Bangladesh, Pakistan; and the Myanmarese arms bazaar. 
 
The political economy of violence 
The various militant groups across NEI have been substantially criminalised. Many are 
involved in gun-running as well as extortion and abduction. It has been alleged that the 
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has collected more than Rs5bn (£50m) 
through extortion, abduction and kidnappings. Another source of funds for insurgent 
groups is the imposition of taxation in areas under their control. It has also been alleged 
that many are involved in drug-trafficking, however given that some of the groups have a 
strong moral agenda and oppose drug-use this allegation is contested. There is, however, 
overwhelming evidence of a complex “web of collusion” between insurgent groups, 
politicians and political parties. A large quantity of the northeast states’ revenues are 
siphoned off and distributed to a well-established nexus of politicians, administrators and 
insurgent organisations. For example, sources estimate that of the Rs11.65bn made 
available in Assam for rural development from 1992 to February 1998, less than Rs4bn 
went into legitimate schemes. This criminalisation of politics and crisis of governance is 
a significant obstacle to peace. 
 
Impact of armed violence 
There is a strong culture of violence in the region with a lack of respect for human life 
and human rights. The size of the security forces and their deployment within 
communities has had many adverse impacts: high levels of physical and sexual violence, 
prostitution, substance abuse and harassment. Counterinsurgency operations and inter-
ethnic violence has displaced large amounts of people, who are the most vulnerable in 
terms of poverty, insecurity and poor health. Violence against women and children has 
also increased. The impact on the wider economy is felt through: 1) a drain on resources 
due to the systems of “taxation” and the effects of the frequent bandhs (general strikes); 
2) the decline of business confidence and a flight of capital, either directly by 
intimidation, kidnapping and extortion, or indirectly through the general climate of fear; 
and 3) disruptions to the provision of services such as health and education. 
 
Recommendations 
While DFID is not involved in development work in NEI, there are a number of issues 
that need to be addressed for armed violence to be reduced in the area. The key to a stable 
future lies in the demilitarisation of the area and a community-based development 
programme which deals with local concerns over the distribution of resources. In 
addition, the GOI should be encouraged to develop an assistance package for IDPs and 
should allow international observers and NGOs, such as UNHCR, access to refugees and 
IDPs in the region.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Northeast India (NEI) comprises the seven states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. The area has suffered from a large number 
of distinct conflicts for over five decades, fuelled by a number of issues: land distribution, 
immigration, ethnicity, religion, and political autonomy/secession. More than half a 
million people have lost their lives to insurgency in the area since Indian independence in 
1947. Each conflict has its own roots and history, and each insurgent group – of which 
there are currently over 72 (and this number continues to rise) – has its own agenda. 
These include the protection of language and ethnicity, tribal rivalry, control over local 
resources, and opposition to immigration. According to many scholars and commentators 
the proliferation of armed groups has been, and continues to be, fuelled by the easy 
availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW). One NEI commentator argues: 
“The sheer volume of weapons floating about in the region becomes a primary source of 
escalation and transformation of social tensions into armed conflict.”1 The easy 
availability of SALW and the growing network between insurgent groups has helped 
reduce the time between setting up a group and it becoming a full-scale armed guerrilla 
group making a political impact.2 Here a clear link can be made between the easy 
availability of SALW and the level of violence. However, the hard-hitting response of the 
Government of India (GOI) and the continuation of what many in NEI see as an 
“occupation” has also helped to fuel the violence. The likely impacts of this on prospects 
for development and poverty reduction will be assessed throughout the report. 
  
2. The context of armed violence 
 
2.1 The historical context 
 
Until the 1960s, Arunachal Pradesh3, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Mizoram were 
all part of one state – Assam. The two other states – Manipur and Tripura – were princely 
states during British colonial rule, and subsequently became Union Territories. The rest 
of the NEI states came into existence after the North Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act 
of 1971 which began the process of dividing Assam into smaller states. Some these states 
owe their boundaries to their prior status as autonomous districts with district councils. 
 
The region is landlocked, sandwiched between Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China; 
practically its entire boundary is an international border. NEI covers an area of 255,037 
square kilometers and is linked to the rest of India by a narrow 21 km-wide corridor, 
often referred to as the “chicken neck”. The “seven sisters”, as they are commonly 
known, make up 8% of India’s geographical area and 4% of its population – around 35 
million. Two-thirds of the region is hilly terrain. This geographically isolated and 
economically underdeveloped area is home to around 220 different indigenous groups 
                                                 
1 Routray, 2002. 
2 Routray, 2002. 
3 Before 1962 Arunachal was known as the North Eastern Frontier Agency and was constitutionally a part of Assam. It 
was administered by the Ministry of External Affairs until 1965 and subsequently by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
through the Governor of Assam. In 1972, it was constituted as a Union Territory and renamed Arunachal Pradesh. 
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and has over 160 “scheduled tribes”, defined as the original inhabitants identified as such 
in a separate “schedule” of the GOI.4 This continues a distinction introduced by British 
colonialism, which, after the subjugation of Assam in 18265, segregated the tribal 
population into excluded areas that were administered differently from the rest of India.6 
This system prohibited access to these areas to all outsiders, even fellow Indians.7 This 
restricted access continues today, as does the system of “protective discrimination”, 
which restricts the rights of “non-tribals” to land ownership and exchange, business and 
trading licenses, and access to elected office.8
 
The confusing ethnic landscape of NEI, particularly outside of Assam, fits well with its 
recent history of “slash and burn” agriculture and poorly defined “territories”. The 
fissures that existed between tribal and non-tribal populations were further deepened by 
the widespread conversion of the hill tribes to Christianity.9 However, it is important to 
note that NEI is not a unified area. For example, before Indian independence, Assam had 
a developed state, economy and economic relations with India; Nagaland, on the other 
hand, was a tribal society divided into two-dozen tribes until the 1940s when the idea of a 
“Naga nation” emerged. Many academics and commentators regard the tendency to lump 
the region together as one and thus to see its various problems as unitary (particularly by 
the GOI), as a problem itself.10
 
2.2 The economy of the northeast 
 
The pace of development in the hill areas and plains varies considerably. The valleys are 
economically active areas, with that of the Brahmaputra being the most active. On the 
whole, however, the majority of NEI states are underdeveloped agrarian societies with 
weak industrial sectors and inflated service sectors. NEI contributes only 1% of the whole 
of India’s manufacturing output. The industrial sector has mainly developed around tea, 
oil and timber in Assam, and mining, saw mills and plywood factories in other parts of 
the region.11 Most large and medium-sized private industry is in Assam, which is the 
major economy of the region. However, since the early 1990s there has been almost zero 
growth in the manufacturing sector in Assam.  
 
The use of primitive farming methods means that the region is unable to produce enough 
grain to feed its population. Economic growth rates and per capita NSDP (net state 
domestic product) have stagnated since the early 1990s. Despite agriculture being the 
                                                 
4 The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, launched in the 1950s, was an attempt to give small tribal communities 
extensive powers to protect their traditions and land.  
5 In this period, economic and political linkages with Bengal were very important. Independence and partition, which 
created East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), terminated this important connection with Calcutta, which had a devastating 
impact on the northeast’s economic and communication links. This also created mass migration which upset the 
demographic balance in neighbouring northeast areas. (Lieten, 2002) 
6 Laws in the rest of India were seen to be unsuitable to the stage of development of the populations of the hill areas. 
7 However, foreigners may visit some parts of Assam and Meghalaya with a valid India visa. 
8 In Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland, all but one seat are reserved for the scheduled tribes; in Meghalaya, 55 
of the 60 seats are reserved (Baruah, 2003a, p923-33). 
9 Cultural diversity in the region was further complicated by the British policy of importing large numbers of 
administrators, tea plantation workers and cultivators from other parts of India. (Lieten, 2002) 
10 Misra, 2000. 
11 Sachdeva, 2000, p37. 
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mainstay of the economy, the land available for cultivation is less than in other parts of 
India and only a small proportion is irrigated. Tradition “slash and burn” methods are still 
used in some hilly areas.12 Despite the creation of new states, the basic problem of 
integration and balanced economic development remains. In an attempt to address these 
problems the GOI has, since 2001, made the Department of North East Development a 
Cabinet-level department – no other region of the country has such a presence in the 
GOI.13  
 
In terms of infrastructure, the experience is mixed. According to the CMIE Index of 
Infrastructures, Assam, with 82 points, is not far behind the national average of 100, but 
the other northeastern states are much further behind, with Arunachal Pradesh the worst 
with only 44 points.14 Surprisingly (but probably linked to missionary activity), except 
for Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya, all the other states of the region have literacy rates 
above the national average, and as a whole the region has a female literacy rate 
significantly above the national average. Literacy rates amongst scheduled tribes are also 
high. However, some research indicates that the quality of education may not be that 
good. For example, only 45% of all teachers at all levels in the region are qualified, 
compared to the national average of 87%.15 Lack of infrastructure, particularly 
communication, transportation and power, together with the lack of investible capitals 
and lack of entrepreneurship has slowed the pace of development and has fuelled some of 
the violence.  
 
3. The underlying conflict dynamics 
 
3.1 The politics of uneven development 
 
Throughout the 20th century, the tribal societies of NEI have been going through a 
process of transition from shifting cultivation to settled agriculture, from clan control of 
land to commodification of land, urbanization and cultural change. The breakneck pace 
of this change has been referred to by one commentator as “one thousand years in a 
lifetime”.16 These changes have allowed “spaces” for new economic activity, which has 
attracted large-scale immigration, particularly from Bangladesh (formerly East 
Pakistan).17 Because of the “protective discrimination” regime, informal arrangements 
have emerged in land ownership and business practices.18 Sometimes this has meant that 
tribals have lost their land to non-tribals; for example, in Karbi Anglong, Assam. 
However, it is far too complex a situation to say that non-tribals always exploit tribals. 
The privatization of clan lands has allowed class differentiation within tribal 
                                                 
12  Sachdeva, 2000, p20-22. 
13 Baruah, 2003a, p920. 
14 The Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy uses seven indicators: transport facilities, energy, irrigation, banking 
facilities, communication facilities, education facilities, and health facilities. Sachdeva, 2000, p39-40. 
15 Sachdeva, 2000, p45-50. 
16 Hazarika, “Bloodsport“. 
17 “At least a part of the significant rise of population of northeast India has to be explained by this migrating proletariat 
meeting the labour demands of the building boom in the region – made possible partly by the state resources pumped 
into the area and the substantial leakage of funds through corruption – and the class relations in the emerging forms of 
post-shifting cultivation agriculture.” (Baruah, 2003b, p56). 
18 Baruah, 2003b, p54. 
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communities. “Land grabs” have been made possible by official policies that have 
encouraged plantation crops such as tea, coffee and rubber.  
 
The ethnic politics of the region is related to the growing importance of land relations and 
land use. District authorities do not consult with tribal peoples about the use of land. 
Shifting cultivation is regarded by those in authority as primitive and unproductive but 
transitions to other forms of cultivation has tended to accentuate inequality in terms of 
agricultural technology to the detriment of tribals. A study conducted in the North Cachar 
Hills of Assam, for example, found that while farmers were encouraged to cultivate 
coffee, when global coffee prices dropped and support was withdrawn, the plantations 
were closed and there was no back up given to local people to pick up the pieces.19  
 
An unintended consequence of the “protective discrimination” regime is that there is a 
perception that scheduled tribes who have a homeland have managed to insulate 
themselves against these changes. This means that a homeland has become something to 
which all ethnic groups have come to aspire.20  For example, in Mizoram, a supporter of 
the Reang demand for a homeland said: “If the 60,000 Chakmas can have their own 
Autonomous District Council in Mizoram, why not the Reangs with a population of about 
90,000.”21 And in Manipur, a former Deputy Inspector of Police and a Kuki, P.Gangte, 
said: “In India alone we have a population of about three lakh (300,000) and including 
Myanmar we could easily be about 10 lakh. If Mizoram could get a state with only five 
lakh people in 1987, why not the Kukis?22 Given the ethnic patchwork quilt of some 
regions in NEI this has fuelled some of the more brutal attempts to forcibly displace those 
of another tribe. For example, the kidnapping and beheading in Assam in 2003 of four 
Kuki schoolboys by Karbi insurgents was designed to terrorise and force out the Kuki 
minority.23  
 
While the dividing up of Assam into separate states may have partly fulfilled political 
demands for self-rule from certain tribal groups, many of these states do not have the 
revenue resources to meet their own administrative and development expenditure.24 Most 
of the NEI states are “special category” states that rely primarily on assistance from the 
GOI. The overwhelming proportion of the finances of NEI states comes from the GOI: 
for Assam this is 69%, for the rest it is around 80%; the India average is 42%.25 “Non-
plan” expenditure (e.g. interest payments, public employee wages and social services) is 
high in most of the northeast. The NEI states’ own tax revenues are very low, sometimes 
negligible.26 The per capita assistance from the GOI is huge compared to other Indian 
states. For example, from 1992-7 Arunachal Pradesh received Rs36,237 (£434.70) per 
capita, Assam received Rs3,161 (£37.92) per capita, while the poorest state in India, 
Bihar, only received Rs876 (£10.50) per capita.27 This makes the NEI states almost 
                                                 
19 Barbora, 2002, p1289. 
20 Baruah, 2003b, p53. 
21 Quoted in Baruah, 2003b, p59. 
22 Hindustan Times (Delhi), February 12, 1994. 
23 AFP, 14 November 2003. 
24 Sachedeva, 2000, p60. 
25 Sachdeva, 2000, p62. 
26 Sachdeva, 2000, p62. 
27 Sachdeva, 2000, p78-9. 
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entirely dependent on New Delhi for their finances, and encourages fiscal irresponsibility 
by local politicians.28  
3.2 The parties to the violence 
 
The parties to the violence are: 
 The Government of India (GOI)  
 The regional states 
 A plethora of secessionist groups – there are now over 72 armed rebel groups.  
 
The first major armed insurgency was that of the Nagas.29 In the decades to follow, other 
armed groups emerged: in the 1960s, that of the Mizo and the Manipuris. Many of these 
groups were made up of the educated elites of different tribes who were struggling for 
political power and the gains of modernization.30 The proliferation of state structures in 
the northeast has been, in part, the GOI response to these insurgencies. By creating state 
structures, it was hoped that this would foster stakeholders in the Indian Union. However, 
other insurgent groups emerged to fight for full independence from India, such as the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Manipur.  
 
Since the 1990s there has been a proliferation of insurgent groups representing various 
tribes and ethnic communities. For example, according to Nephram (2004), there were 
only three insurgency groups in Manipur until the 1980s, by the 1990s this had increased 
to 27.31 In the month of July 2004 alone, another two rebel groups had emerged on the 
scene.32 There is, of course, a problem in attributing the proliferation of insurgent groups 
to the wide and easy availability of SALW. The direction of causation could easily lie in 
the other direction – that the increased supply of SALW is in response to increased 
demand. However, it is possible to suggest that the easy availability of SALW and the 
growing network between insurgent groups across the whole of NEI means that small 
groups can easily arm themselves and make an impact out of all proportion to their size.33 
Some of these conflicts are between Bodo-Santhals, Bodo-Karbis, Kuki-Naga, Kuki-
Paites, Tamil-Kukis, Reangs-Hmars, and between tribals and non-tribals. So, in addition 
to the wars being waged against the GOI there are now conflicts within the various 
communities and tribes. These should be regarded as “wars within a war”.  
 
Although each insurgent group has its own agenda, some of the issues they raise include 
the protection of language and ethnicity, tribal rivalry, migration, control over local 
resources, access to water and a widespread feeling of alienation from “mainland” 
India.34 For example, most of the violence between Bodos and Santhals has been over the 
control of resources. Tactics of guerrilla warfare, revolution and, more recently, terrorism 
                                                 
28 Baruah, 2003a, p924. 
29 Misra, 2000, argues that Assamese nationalism alienated hill tribes and helped to break up Assam.  
30 Misra, 2000. 
31 Nepram, 2004. 
32 Correspondence with Nepram, July 2004. 
33 Routray, 2002. 
34 VIC, 2003. 
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are evident across the states. The situation in each of the “seven sisters” is discussed 
briefly below.  
 
1.2.1 Nagaland 
 
When India gained independence in 1947, leaders in Nagaland rejected ideas that they 
should become part of India. This escalated into armed confrontation between rebels and 
GOI forces in the 1950s. This is one of the world’s least-known but longest-running 
conflicts.35 The Nagaland National Council (NNC), which initially led the fight for 
independence, was drawn from traditional village councils. This gave it strength and 
legitimacy but this led later to its downfall as it splintered into tribal groupings.36 After 
the Indian Union state of Nagaland emerged in 1963, the NNC gradually became 
marginalized. Corruption became rife in the Naga state, which fuelled the emergence of 
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN).37 Established in 1980, it is still the 
main insurgency group in NEI. Despite its initial goal of fighting for a socialist state, it is 
now plagued by inter-tribal rivalry, and fratricidal clashes between the two factions, 
NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K have resulted in more deaths than fighting between the 
insurgents and the security forces. There were 128 insurgency-related incidents in 2001, 
and 208 in 2002.38
 
By far the largest and most powerful faction, the NCSN-IM, boasts nearly 3,000 armed 
cadres. Myanmar and Bangladesh are its primary safe havens. Relations with Myanmar 
guerrillas and China facilitate the movement of arms to them.39 The NSCN as a whole 
attracts large numbers of Naga youth and is virtually a parallel government in remote 
areas.40  
 
The peace process, in operation since a ceasefire was declared between the GOI and the 
NSCN-IM in 1997, has brought its own problems. The NSCN-IM’s goal of a “Greater 
Nagaland” can only come at the expense of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. 
This has fuelled protest in these states, particularly Manipur. The illegal immigration of 
Muslims from Bangladesh is also emerging as a major issue. 
 
3.2.2 Assam  
 
The insurgency in Assam started in 1979 and has been characterized by escalating 
violence and a decline in popular support over the past few years. It primarily emerged 
out of the issue of immigration from Bangladesh. In 2002 there were 454 insurgency-
related killings, while in 2001 there were 606.41 The United Liberation Front of Assam 
(ULFA), which was established in 1979, continues to be the main group, despite the 
                                                 
35 Misra, 2000. 
36 The GOI tried to undermine it by dissolving tribal councils and reorganizing villages, much like the Americans did in 
Vietnam. 
37 Baruah, 2003a, p919. 
38 Nagaland Assessment 2003, SATP. 
39 Sahni, 2002, p13-18. 
40 Misra, 2000. 
41 Assam Assessment 2003, SATP. 
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signing of an accord between its leaders and the GOI in 1985. The Bodos started a second 
round of insurgency in the late 1980s for a separate state. The main Bodo insurgency 
group, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) has been blamed for the 
bomb blast in October 2004, which killed 56 and injured more than 150.42  
 
Since the late 1990s there has been a proliferation of organizations along tribal, religious 
or cultural lines. Increasing attacks on immigrant Muslims from Bangladesh have pushed 
Muslims – both immigrant and Assamese – towards militancy.43 There are now at least 
15 Muslim militant groups, some backed by Pakistan’s intelligence agency the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI).44 A recent paper traces the emergence of Muslim 
fundamentalist organizations such as the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam 
(MULTA), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and the Muslim United Liberation Front of 
Assam (MULFA).45 Violence between and within other ethnic groups is also 
widespread.46 This violence is displacing tens of thousands of people.47
 
Recent activities suggest that the ULFA has a good stockpile of weapons and is highly 
mobile (see Box 4 for an inventory). It has disrupted communications and hit various 
economic targets, including abducting and killing businessmen, civilians and government 
officials. A spectacular attack on a petrol refinery in March 2003 caused Rs200m (£2.4m) 
damage.48  
 
3.2.3 Manipur  
 
Manipur acquired statehood in 1947, and was “merged” with the Union of India in 1949. 
The first insurgent groups were formed in opposition to what they saw as an 
unconstitutional merger or annexation. Topographically, the State of Manipur comprises 
of two distinct geographical regions: the “emerald valley” (9% of the entire state) and the 
“blue rugged hills” (91%). The hills are exclusively reserved for 30% of the tribal 
population and 75% of the total population of Manipur is confined to the tiny valley area. 
The fertile valley is the abode of the Meiteis who account for nearly 65% of the 
population. Many of the unemployed and student youth, having no political outlet for 
their grievances, have become ready recruits to the various insurgent groups. The conflict 
involves a variety of insurgent groups, constituted along tribal affiliations, and all 
fighting against the government for sovereign or separate homelands. The Meitei, who 
are the major ethnic group in Manipur, are not recognized as a scheduled tribe and 
strongly resent the benefits that the scheduled tribes receive. It is the Meitei who make up 
the membership of the Maoist or socialist insurgent groups, such as the PLA.49 The 
Meitei insurgent groups are bitter rivals of the NSCN-IM. Casualties from armed 
violence increased significantly in 2001 and 2002. 
                                                 
42 The NDFB were also blamed for a twin bomb attack in Nagaland which killed over 36 people. BBC Online, 3 
October 2004, “Fresh blasts hit northeast India”. Although the ULFA and Pakistani ISI have also been implicated. 
43 Misra, 2000. 
44 Sahni, 2002, p4-9. 
45 Saika, 2003. 
46 Sahni, 2002, p5-7. 
47 Assam Backgrounder, SATP. 
48 Assam Assessment 2003, SATP. 
49 Manipur Backgrounder, SATP. 
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Box 2: Armed violence in Manipur (1998 – 2003) 50
Casualties 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
Insurgents 77 101 161 53 6 5 
Security 
Forces 
18 53 25 26 12 29 
Civilians 16 36 70 27 9 41 
TOTAL 111 190 256 106 27  75 
 
A multiplicity of secondary conflicts have arisen out of tensions between various ethnic 
and tribal subgroups, often as a result of changes in patterns of land tenure and 
distribution. The Naga-Kuki ethnic violence, which erupted in 1992, has claimed 
hundreds of lives and displaced thousands (see Box 3). This was sparked by a rise in the 
“house tax” and “village tax” being levied by Naga insurgents, the NSCN-IM, which was 
resented by the Kukis and led to violent clashes between the two groups.51 The Kuki 
National Front (KNF) and the Kuki National Army (KNA) were formed as a result of this 
and are now pressing for a separate Kuki state within the Union of India. About 37,000 
Kuki refugees are housed in 26 relief camps situated all over Manipur, the largest of 
which is situated at Kangpokpi. One of the refugees in the camp said: “President’s rule is 
of no use for us. Give us arms, we can take care of the NSCN-IM.” Another refugee said: 
“Even our 10-year-old children are accusing us of being useless and are ready to go out 
into the jungles with arms to kill the NSCN. We are having a tough time restraining our 
children.”52
 
Box 3: Kuki-Naga ethnic violence during 1992-9753  
Year Tribe Killed Injured No. of houses burned 
1992 Kuki  
Naga  
11 
2 
22 
26 
11 
0 
 Total  13 48 11 
1993 Kuki 
Naga 
261 
60 
69 
72 
2144 
1365 
 Total  321 140 3509 
1994 Kuki  
Naga 
95 
67 
49 
28 
262 
425 
 Total 162 77 687 
1995 Kuki  
Naga 
65 
44 
39 
43 
404 
653 
 Total  109 82 1057 
1996 Kuki  
Naga 
32 
21 
18 
15 
61 
127 
 Total 53 33 188 
1997 Kuki  
Naga 
9 
14 
13 
13 
27 
6 
 Total 23 26 33 
                                                 
50 Manipur Assessment, SATP. 
51 The NSCN-IM were demanding Rs100 (£1.19) per house, and Rs1,000 per village. 
52 Hindustan Times (Delhi), February 12, 1994. 
53 Imphal Secretariat Archives, 1997. 
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In addition to Meitei, Kuki and Naga rebel groups, several other tribes, such as the Paite, 
Vaiphei and Hmars, have also launched their own insurgent groups in recent years. 
Besides the Kuki-Naga rivalry, there have been ethnic clashes between the Kukis and 
Paites, in which more than 4,500 houses were burned leaving hundreds dead and several 
thousands homeless. In one incident, in June 1997 in Churachandpur, some armed Kuki 
militants attacked a Paite village and killed at least 10 villagers on the pretext that there 
were some Naga militants taking shelter in the village. There are also reports that the 
once peaceful Paities are taking up arms in response to the Kukis who are forcing the 
Paite people to pay taxes to them. Manipuri Muslims, who have been targeted by some 
insurgent groups, have now also set up their own militant groups.54  
 
3.2.4 Tripura  
 
The main cause of insurgency in Tripura can be traced to the huge influx of refugees 
from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) following partition. The indigenous people, who 
accounted for 95% of the population of Tripura in the 1931 census had, by the 1991 
census, been reduced to just 31%.55 An estimated 609,998 immigrants entered Tripura 
between 1947 and 1971. The pressures of the migrant population pushed tribals into less 
hospitable lands in the hilly interior. Forests were cleared and the population density in 
Tripura rose. Government jobs as well as control over trade and business is dominated by 
immigrants. This has sparked serious discontent among the tribals, who have become a 
minority in their own land. The violence has taken on a particularly sectarian and brutal 
character as it is powered by an attempt to forcibly displace – or kill – non-tribals, 
particularly Bangladeshis. In 2003, 295 people were killed through insurgent-related 
violence.56
 
The first insurgent groups fighting for tribal rights emerged in the 1970s. Today, there are 
over 30 militant groups. However, only two are responsible for most militant activities – 
the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) 
– the others are mainly criminal gangs or dormant.57 The NLFT, which has forged links 
with the NSCN-IM and the ULFA is the most lethal group, but both it and the ATTF are 
proscribed under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). 
 
3.2.5 Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram 
 
The relatively “peaceful” NEI states of Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram are 
not without armed violence. 
 
Meghalaya become a state in the Union of India in 1972. However, inter-tribal rivalry 
and acrimony over immigrants from Bangladesh and Nepal has led to a growth of 
militant organizations whose violence is directed against other ethnic groups. There are 
an estimated 300,000 people of Nepali or Bangladeshi origin in Meghalaya’s population 
                                                 
54  Sahni, 2002: 9-13. 
55 Maitra, 2002, p150-154. 
56 Tripura Assessment 2003, SATP. 
57 Sahni, 2002, p21. 
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of 1.7m. The economic situation – with increasing unemployment – has also been 
pinpointed as a cause of increasing violence. Events took an ugly turn in 1992 when 
rioting in Shillong claimed 31 lives.58 This was the fifth major riot against “dkhars” or 
outsiders since 1979. Shillong has a population of 350,000 of which 40% are non-tribal, 
consisting of Bengalis, Assamese, Napalese, Marwaris and others. However, Meghalaya 
also suffers from it being a prime sanctuary and supply base for NE insurgents, 
particularly the NSCN, the ULFA, and the BUSF.59 “Operation Birdie”, which was 
launched between March and April 1997 by the Indian army, provoked widespread 
protest. From 1994 to 2002 there were 2004 insurgency-related deaths.60 Recently, 
killings, kidnapping and extortion have been on the rise.61  The NSCN-IM is the main 
ally of the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC) and provides all sorts of support 
including training facilities and weaponry.62
 
Mizoram has been relatively peaceful since its inception in 1986 after a 20-year 
insurgency. The Mizo National Front (MNF), which fought for a Mizo state, transformed 
itself into a regional political party. In 2002, there were no major terrorism-related 
incidents. However, the abduction of employees of the North-Eastern Electricity Power 
Corp Ltd shows that some groups (in this case the Hmar People’s Convention – 
Democrats) are active here too. The Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) – which is 
spearheading most of the violence that takes place in Mizoram – is an armed outfit of the 
Reang tribe. A major source of its finance is gained through abductions and ransoms. It 
has been reported that its cadres carry out attacks with AK assault rifles, grenades and 
bombs.63  
 
Arunachal Pradesh suffers primarily from the overflow of violence from Nagaland. 
Insurgent groups such as NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, ULFA and the NDFB have been using 
Arunachal Pradesh to locate their hideouts, have been abducting people as a source of 
finance, and have been trying to extort money from businesses such as Oil India 
Limited.64 However, in recent years discontent from local groups has also emerged 
against the Chakmas, a mostly Buddhist group from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, who were 
resettled in the border region with China in the mid-1960s after a dam displaced them.65
 
3.3 The relationship between the NEI states and the Government of India 
 
Each NEI state is part of the Indian Union and has its own elected state legislatures and 
elected chief minister. However, this federalism is largely cosmetic given the existence of 
a parallel de facto structure of government, made up of the Indian Army, other military 
and intelligence units (and the limited participation of state-level politicians and senior 
civil servants). This manages counter-insurgency operations and is directly controlled by 
                                                 
58 Shillong Times (Shillong), October 11, 1992. The Khasi’s  ‘poison arrows’ were reportedly used to kill non-tribals. 
59 North East Sun, May 15-31, 1998. 
60 Meghalaya Backgrounder, SATP. 
61 North East Sun (Delhi), Vol. l3, No.19, May 1-14, 1998. 
62 North East Sun, 1998. 
63 Mizoram Assessment 2003, SATP. 
64 Sahni, 2002: 24-28. 
65 USCR, 2000, p10. 
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the home ministry in New Delhi.66 Potential conflicts between the civil government and 
the security establishment means that the governor, which is appointed by the GOI, has a 
crucial role to play in the northeast, unlike elsewhere in the Indian Union. A recent 
analysis of the career profiles of the governors of all seven NEI states showed that all had 
occupied high positions in India’s security establishments or had close ties to it. 
According to this research, such ties ensure that the “demands of security override the 
rules of democracy in the event of a conflict between the two.”67 For example, in Assam 
in 1998, charges of corruption against the chief minister were not pursued, as he was 
important to the security establishment.68 Elected state governments can also be 
dismissed in situations of instability; as happened, for example in 1990 in Assam.  
 
4. The significance of small arms and light weapons  
 
4.1 Easy availability 
 
The most significant aspect of SALW in NEI is that the easy availability of arms and 
ammunition, and the growing networking between armed groups, has helped reduce the 
time between setting up a group and it becoming a full-scale armed guerrilla group. Many 
of the militant groups have more modern arms and equipment than the state police. In 
Manipur, for example, 6,770 cadre across 12 insurgent groups are armed with 3,750 
weapons.69 One well-informed observer makes this point clearly. “The ability of the 
insurgent groups in the northeast to engage the Indian state in protracted little wars is 
substantially the result of the easy access to these tools of terror.”70  
 
There are no figures on gun possession in NEI. However, in South Asia as a whole, the 
numbers of AK-47s in the possession of states and non-state actors has been estimated to 
have increased from virtually nil to nearly 8 million over the 20-year period from 1980 to 
2000.71 There are an estimated 75m firearms in South Asia, 63m of which are in civilian 
hands.72 The easy availability of SALW has, in the context of NEI, helped insurgent 
groups have an impact out of all proportion to their size. It has assisted them in criminal 
activities such as extortion, allowed them to kill with impunity and helped them to usurp 
“political space in states like Manipur.”73 The rapid rise in the availability of weapons is 
indicated by the increase in weaponry in the ULFA’s possession in just 10 years. (see 
Box 4 below) 
 
                                                 
66 Baruah, 2003a. 
67 Baruah, 2002, p184. 
68 Baruah, 2002, p184. 
69 Routray, 2002. 
70 Routray, 2002. 
71 Boyden, 2002, p28. 
72 IANSA.org 
73 Routray, 2002. 
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4.2 Sources 
 
Over 13 sources of SALW into the Indo-Myanmar region can be identified: 
1. Myanmarese insurgent groups/arms bazaar. 
2. The Southeast Asian black market. 
3. China 
4. South Asian countries such as Cambodia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. 
5. South Asian insurgent groups, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
Jammu and Kashmir groups, Punjab extremists, the Maoist Communist Party 
operating in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and the Nepalese Communist Maoist forces. 
6. Other parts of India, e.g. Uttar Pradesh, particularly through pilferages from legal gun 
factories. 
7. Criminal gangs operating in India and other South Asian countries. 
8. The Indian security forces. Home security guards are the most vulnerable. 
9. International market. 
10. Some tribes within the region produce weapons such as knives, spears and daos.  
11. Fellow insurgent groups in NEI. 
12. Some NEI politicians reportedly have become suppliers of weapons. 
13. The RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), India’s foreign intelligence agency, has 
been known to arm some outfits operating in the region.74 
 
Box 4: ULFA weapons inventory 1986-1996: the proliferation of SALW75
Weapons Inventory 
1986 1996 
G Series 
AK 47/57 
Semi – Automatics 
LMG 
Sten/Carbine 
American Carbines 
Pistols 
Handmade Weapons 
Grenades 
Ammunition 
None 
1 
2-4 
None 
None 
None 
9-10 
10-20 
None 
Unknown 
250 
60+
130 
20 
116 
62 
336 
6 
1,143 
70,000+
 
The single most important factor in this prevalence of SALW throughout South Asia is 
considered to be the massive funding for the arming of the mujahideen in Afghanistan by 
the U.S. through Pakistan. After 1989, an estimated 70% of these weapons were siphoned 
off by the ISI, Afghan leaders and field commanders and found their way into 
commercial channels.76 The 6,196 weapons seized in NEI between 1991 and 2002 are 
therefore seen as merely the “tip of the iceberg”.77  
 
                                                 
74 Nepram, 2002, 2004. 
75 Kartha, 1999, p269. 
76 Boyden, 2002, p28. 
77 Routray, 2002. 
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Initial training in China and then contacts with Myanmar rebel groups gave NEI insurgent 
groups their first access to weapons.78 But abundant supplies of SALW really took off in 
the late 1980s, through the underground markets in Thailand and Myanmar. Weapons 
from the Cambodian conflict over a decade and a half later are still awash in the region 
and are reaching the insurgents through Cox’s Bazaar, a completely unmonitored port in 
Bangladesh.79 Tripura has also emerged as a major corridor for pushing arms into the 
northeast.80 Nepram (2004) identified 57 different types of SALW which have flooded 
NEI over the past several years. The origins of these weapons have been traced to a 
variety of countries, such as China, Pakistan, Belgium, Thailand, Russia, United States of 
America, United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Myanmar and, more recently, Israel.81 Research charting the movement of weapons has 
claimed that two major deliveries were made to the ULFA and another to the NSCM in 
2001 alone.82  A consignment supplied to the ULFA by the Karen National Union (KNU) 
in 1993 reportedly included: 775 AK-56 rifles, 65 GPMGs, 10 rocket-propelled guns, 
more than 100 anti-tank shells, 50 pistols, and assorted ammunitions.83  
 
4.3 Porous borders and safe havens 
 
With porous borders (in remote and rugged hill and mountain areas) and the passive (and 
even active) support for some insurgents by other states in the region, it is hardly 
surprising that the insurgents have easy access to weapons. China and Pakistan have, at 
different phases, trained more than 5,000 insurgents and provided them with modern 
arms.84 This support continues. Indian intelligence sources have uncovered recent 
contacts between the ULFA and the NSCN-IM and China.85 And Pakistan’s ISI has been 
implicated in assisting northeast insurgent groups through training camps in Bangladesh, 
particularly the Islamist groups emerging in Assam.86 Bangladesh has also served as a 
safe haven and training place for many of the militant groups, such as the ULFA, as well 
as an important area through which the supply of weapons has flowed (mostly through 
the MULTA and the MULFA).87 In fact, an investigation in 2000 into a shipment of arms 
in December 1995, which was bound for northeast insurgents, implicated the former 
Bangladeshi government of Begum Zia.88 Commentators suggest that the mortars used in 
attacks by the ULFA in 2003 were likely to have been procured through Bangladesh.89  
Myanmar has also served as a safe haven to groups such as the NSCN-K, the NSCN-IM 
and the ULFA. The Myanmar government up until recently turned a blind eye to their 
activities but recent campaigns have compelled the ULFA to relocate along the border 
                                                 
78 Nepram, 2004. 
79 Routray, 2002. In April 1996, Bangladesh forces seized more than 500 AK-47s, more than 80 general purpose 
machine guns, 50 rocket launchers and over 2,000 grenades from vessels off Cox’s Bazaar. 
80 Sahni, 2002, p19-20. 
81 Nepram, 2004. 
82 Routray, 2002. 
83 Asian Age (Delhi), August 14, 1995. 
84 Maitra, 2002, p13. 
85 Ramana, 2002, p2. 
86 Ramana, 2002, p4. 
87 Ramana, 2002, p4. 
88 “India arms case reopened”, BBC Online, 24 April 2000. 
89 Assam Backgrounder, SATP. 
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with the Chittagong Hill Tracts.90 In 2003, Bhutan started to evict insurgent groups such 
as the ULFA and the NDBF, who had well-established camps inside the country.  
 
4.4 Networking between armed groups 
 
There are a number of connections and alliances between the insurgent groups. Inter-
group linkages are primarily those between the ULFA and other groups, and the Naga 
insurgents and other groups. The most recent and formal of the alliances is the United 
Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFSS) formed in the context of opposition to the 
NSCN-IM proposal of a “Greater Nagaland”. Its members are the NSCN-K, the ULFA, 
Dima Halim Daogah, the United People’s Democratic Solidarity, the Arunachal Dragon 
Front, the People’s Liberation Army, and the Revolutionary Democratic Front.  
 
In one of the most publicized arms haul, “Operation Leech”, in February 1998 over the  
high seas off the Andaman Islands, the security forces killed six gun-runners, arrested 73 
others and seized a consignment of arms. The illegal arms consignment included 
sophisticated AK series rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, night-vision fitted rifles and 
hand grenades. The intended end users of this particular consignment were probably the 
NSCN, the ATTF and the Chin National Army in Myanmar. This arms haul clearly 
showed the connections which the various insurgents have with one another not only in 
the region but also with that of Myanmar insurgents. 91
 
According to one writer “An extremely well-organised network is responsible for supply 
of arms to insurgents.” The larger insurgent groups, such as the NSCN, provide arms – 
and often training – to other NEI insurgents. This has become a huge money earner for 
them.92 Drug trafficking from Myanmar is also providing some of the insurgent groups 
with an income source for the purchase of these weapons.93 According to army sources, 
the arrest of some NSCN-IM leaders in July 1996 revealed the huge amounts of extorted 
drug money that were changing hands in the arms bazaars of south east Asia, particularly 
with the Khmer Rouge.94  
 
5. The political economy of violence 
 
5.1 The underground terror economy 
 
The various militant groups across the seven NEI states have been substantially 
criminalized.95 Many are involved in gun-running as well as extortion and abduction. It 
has been alleged that the ULFA alone has collected more than Rs5bn (£50m) through 
                                                 
90 Ramana, 2002, p5. 
91 Outlook (Delhi), February 1, 1999. 
92 Maitra, 2002, p54. 
93 Maitra, 2002, p53; Boyden, 2002, p8. 
94 Maitra, 2002, p71. 
95 Baruah, 2002, argues that northeast India conforms to Collier’s thesis that there is a strong correlation between a 
specific set of economic conditions such as a region’s dependence on exports of primary commodity and low national 
income and conflict.  
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extortion, abduction and kidnappings.96 It particularly targets tea companies. In fact, 
many companies (and politicians) make their peace with insurgents as many can 
guarantee security and collect tax better than the state can. This is common throughout 
NEI. For example, in 1997, the government of Assam accused several large companies, 
including Tata Teas, of financing militant groups such as the ULFA, because they gave 
into their demands for “protection money”. Other industries have also proved a valuable 
source of funds for the militants. Meghalaya is one of the largest suppliers of coal, and all 
vehicles carrying it have to pass through Assam. Insurgents have been levying taxes on 
the truck drivers and suppliers for the past few years. In fact, the “coal mafia” has 
developed strong links with ULFA militants.97
 
At times these illegal sources of revenue even exceeded the expectation of the insurgents: 
“ ‘It was amazing, we asked for a little and they were prepared to go well beyond what 
we wanted,’ said one ULFA leader. ‘That was when we realized how soft the state was, 
how weak the businessmen were, how much black money they had, that they could pay 
up and still have enough for themselves.”98  
 
Another source of funds for insurgent groups is the imposition of taxation in areas under 
their control. In Nagaland, for example, a social activist, who had traveled around the 
countryside in 1994-95, reported of a system of tax collection imposed by the NSCN as 
well as illegal taxation by the Naga state government’s public works department.99 The 
NSCN also engages in bank robberies and extortion. However, this allegation is 
contested. There are massive networks of extortion and ‘taxation’ run by insurgents in 
their areas of influence. Virtually every vehicle on all major routes in the insurgency-
affected states of NEI pays a “toll tax” at several points. In Manipur and Nagaland, the 
NSCN-IM imposes a “house tax” on every dwelling unit. Insurgent groups control 
virtually all illicit trade  in the region. Some observers allege that drug trafficking is a 
major source of income for the NSCN.100
 
In Manipur, the thriving black economy is being fuelled by growing drug abuse and 
trafficking from Myanmar. This is also helping to spark violence between insurgent 
groups.101 For example, in addition to the ethnic rivalry between the Kuki National Army 
(KNA) and the NSCM-IM, the conflict between the two is also over control of Moreh, a 
trading town which borders Myanmar, which is an important outlet for smuggling guns 
and drugs.102 In Tripura, insurgent groups have turned abduction into an art form – 70% 
of all abductions in the region happen in Tripura.103 Since 1994, 1,550 in Tripura people 
have been kidnapped and huge ransoms have been extracted.104
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5.2 The criminalization of politics 
 
Unfortunately, it is not just a matter of a simple opposition between the GOI and the NEI 
states versus insurgent groups. Five decades of insurgency has led to a breakdown of the 
institutions of civil governance in NEI. A large quantity of the northeast states’ revenues 
are siphoned off and distributed to a well-established nexus of politicians, administrators 
and insurgent organisations. For example, commodities distributed through the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) in Assam, which is the government’s major instrument of 
poverty reduction, are diverted on to the open market. This generated illegal revenues 
amounting to an estimated Rs600m (£7.2m) a month in 1998, a large proportion of which 
went to the ULFA. Insurgent groups have also been known to offload rice, sugar, wheat 
and other essential commodities from the Public Distribution System and distribute these 
among locals at lower prices in order to gain “legitimacy” and support. In addition, 70% 
of all funds available to the state government in Assam for rural development are 
systematically siphoned off through a well-organised network of ULFA and SULFA 
cadres, contractors, civil servants and members of the political executive. Sources 
estimate that of the Rs11.65bn (£139m) made available for rural development from 1992 
to February 1998, less than Rs4bn (£47.7m) went into legitimate schemes.105 There is 
overwhelming evidence of a “complex web of collusion between terrorist outfits and 
various political parties”.106 This relationship helps strengthen the bargaining power of 
some politicians and political parties vis-à-vis the GOI and other parties, and aids the 
insurgents in their extortion rackets.  
 
Sahni and George (2002) argue that the proliferation of armed violence in northeast India 
is not merely a law and order issue, nor merely a development issue. They argue that in 
order to understand the situation – and posit a possible solution – it is necessary to 
understand the dynamics of the underground terrorist economy. These “criminal 
entrepreneurs” are not simply predatory but also collusive. There is often a symbiotic 
relationship between them and government officials/agencies.107 A recent report argues, 
for example, that in Manipur areas where “ethnic cleansing” took place have now been 
used for tea, coffee, spice and flower plantation. The authors of this report suggest that “It 
is possible to infer the intervention of a powerful, ruthless vested interest.”108 Many 
senior state officials and politicians pay extortion money demanded by the insurgents. In 
addition, insurgent groups have made inroads into the functioning of government 
departments, including interference in government contracts and development projects. 
Commercial contracts are often allotted to nominees or members of various insurgent 
groups.  
 
The various links between insurgent groups and NEI politicians and political parties are 
too numerous to go into in detail here; suffice it is to say that some are even helping to 
divert weapons and ammunition to insurgent groups as happened, for example, in 
Nagaland in 1997.109 This criminalisation of politics, and the contraband networks are 
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helping to fuel unrest.110 The widespread collusion between insurgents, regional 
government departments and political parties has meant that the underground economy 
has well-developed and intractable links with the “above-ground” economy.111 NEI states 
suffer from high levels of corruption and, despite large amounts of investment from the 
GOI, a dismal quality of services. This crisis of governance is a significant obstacle to 
peace. 
 
 
6. Social and cultural aspects of armed violence 
6.1 A culture of violence 
 
It is possible to speak of a strong culture of violence in the region, with a lack of respect 
for human life and human rights.112 Bombings, abductions, beheadings and murderous 
attacks on whole villages, including against women and children, have wracked the 
region. “Ethnic cleansing” is a strategy used by some insurgents to clear areas of 
“unwanted” groups thus allowing land for a “homeland”. There is also evidence to 
suggest that violence has increased within communities also. This is discussed in the 
impacts section below.  
 
The culture of violence must be understood as part of the overall militarisation of society 
in NEI. This militarization is both a cause and an obvious effect of the emergence of the 
armed conflicts. The size of the security forces in NEI and their deployment within 
civilian communities has had many adverse impacts: high levels of physical and sexual 
violence, prostitution, exploitation, substance abuse, and harassment.113  (See Appendix  
1 for the location of military posts in Manipur alone.) The resentment this breeds only 
serves to reinforce the dynamics of conflict at the local level.114 For example, in 1997 
Maino Daimary, the publicity secretary of the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) said: 
“Unless you do something against the Indian government or the administration, you do 
not get any response. They [the government] respond only to violence. So we have taken 
up arms.115 Despite widespread antipathy towards the insurgent groups, the security 
forces, in particular the Assam Rifles, are seen by many as an army of occupation. 
Widespread human rights abuses in Assam, Nagaland and Manipur has encouraged 
support for the insurgents.  
6.2 Counterinsurgency operations 
 
The GOI alternates between political pacification and development interventions on the 
one hand and military cleansing of the areas on the other.116 The Armed Forces Special 
Powers Act (AFSPA) has been in place in large parts of the northeast for over four 
decades. After the Nagas held a plebiscite in the early 1950s, with the overwhelming 
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majority voting for independence, the GOI sent in the army and instituted the Internal 
Security Act (which later became the AFSPA). The AFPSA (and the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act) gives the security forces excessive powers, including shoot to kill, and 
contributes to a climate of impunity as legal action cannot be taken against the armed 
forces without the permission of the GOI. Human rights organizations, such as Amnesty 
International, have expressed concern about human rights abuses by the security sector, 
including allegations of rape and death in custody, and the use of torture.117 And the 
Indian human rights activist and attorney, Nandita Haksar, has alleged that collective 
punishment methods are used against villagers accused of harbouring terrorists.  
 
From the Indian government’s perspective, these movements represent not just domestic 
discontent, but the danger of destabilization by Chinese or Pakistani intelligence 
activities. In addition to security concerns, NEI is of great importance to India due to its 
vast deposits of natural resources – oil, gas, timber, fertile land, uranium, and hydropower 
potential. The exploitation of these resources for the benefit of the whole of India has 
stirred up local resentment particularly since it has largely benefited recent immigrants, or 
non-tribal Indians, who have been employed in these industries.118 Many of the dams and 
other infrastructure projects have uprooted hundreds of thousands from their home, 
creating “refugees of development”, and have caused massive environmental degradation 
and pollution.119 In Manipur, for example, hydroelectric power generation has destroyed 
great areas of scarce and very fertile arable land and waterways.120 The impact of dam 
projects is singled out by many to be one of the major causes of the insurgency in 
Tripura.121 The lack of community consultation on these projects further alienates local 
people.122
 
Militarisation is a huge obstacle to peace. The fact that all authority lies with the military 
apparatus, the reality that ordinary people have no recourse to justice and the fact that 
civil society is not involved in the development strategies imposed on it means that 
widespread antipathy to the GOI is unlikely to abate.123 The development strategies 
adopted as well as the process of militarization need to be addressed simultaneously. 
 
7. The impact of armed violence on poverty  
 
7.1 Internal displacement 
 
The patchwork quilt of overlapping ethnicities in NEI means that calls for homelands 
fuels violence against “outsiders” thus creating an “intricate relationship” between 
conflicts over homelands and displacements of people.124 For example, the Bodo 
campaign in Assam – where they only constitute 11% of the population of the area in 
which they want their homeland – has fuelled violence against East Bengali Muslims and 
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Hindus, who have also been victims of the displacements that have followed.125 These 
displacement help spread conflicts confined to a particular region, into other districts. 
 
The US Committee for Refugees (USCR) in its 2000 report estimates that there are 
177,000 IDPs in NEI.126 However, given that the GOI does not allow international 
organizations access to the area, these figures are very tentative  and most likely to vastly 
underestimate the scale of internal displacement in the region. According to the Global 
IDP project there could be as many as half a million IDPs. Estimates made in 2000 
include:  
 87,000 to 200,000 in Assam. 
 31,000 to 41,000 Reangs displaced from Mizoram and living in the refugee camps of 
Tripura. 
 80,000 Bengalis uprooted in Tripura since 1993.   
 No estimates of IDPs in Manipur but conflicts between tribal groups have led to the 
displacement of at least 130,000 Kukis, Paites and Nagas since 1992.  
 As many as 3,000 Chakmas have become IDPs in Arunachal Pradesh.127  
 
Appendix 2 reproduces estimates made by USCR of what it calls the “hidden 
displacement” in NEI. 
 
The main cause of displacement is inter-tribal conflict. But the cause of that conflict is 
disputes over land and autonomy. However, the GOI has also played a direct role in 
displacement through its counterinsurgency operations. For instance, in the 1950s and 
1960s in Nagaland and Mizoram, in order to disrupt the ability of civilians to assist 
insurgents, the GOI forcibly displaced populations. One estimate suggests that 100,000 
people were forcibly relocated in Mizoram.128 In addition, unrest in Arunachal Pradesh is 
largely a result of the GOI resettling 40,000 Chakmas in the border area with China in the 
mid-1960s. (Given the Chakmas loyalty to India, this was also regarded as a good 
security measure.)129 
 
Displacement for many of these tribal groups has meant a continuing downward spiral in 
terms of their quality of life. The GOI has left the problem of IDPs to NEI state 
governments, the result being inconsistencies in conditions for the displaced across the 
region. However, in general, conditions for IDPs are poor – there are no 
intergovernmental or international organizations, they live in makeshift shelters and have 
limited access to food, medicine and education. A USCR visit to Assam in 1998, found 
that in most camps there was little medical care and no formal education; food aid arrived 
“sporadically”, and when it did arrive it was insufficient.130 In Tripura, according to local 
community leaders, 36,000 displaced Reangs live in “inhuman conditions” without 
access to clean drinking water. Hundreds have died from dysentery.131 Some groups, 
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such as the Santhals in Assam, have not been able to return to their villages and farming 
livelihoods due to continuing threats against them, or because the state government has 
reclassified the land as forest.132 No concrete steps have been taken to rehabilitate these 
IDPs thus condemning them to life in camps.133 Some local NGOs try to help where the 
government’s assistance is poor e.g in Tripura and Manipur. 
 
7.2 Impact on children 
 
The impact of armed violence on children has been considerable and can be divided into 
three main areas: displacement and loss of service access, particularly health and 
education; direct targeting by the security forces and insurgent groups; and child labour 
and violence in the home. 
 
7.2.1 Displacement and loss of service access 
 
During the 1998 Bodo-Santhal clashes in Kokrajhar and Bongaigoan districts, Assam, 
102 children were killed and thousands displaced.134 A report, prepared by UNICEF on 
the impact of insurgency and conflict on children in Assam, focused on the status of more 
than 70,000 children in different camps of Kokrajhar. It reported the existence of 76 relief 
camps during 1998, due to continuous ethnic violence. These sheltered 254,787 inmates 
of which 74,103 were children. The report further revealed that 1,257 children were 
orphaned during the violence. The health of most of the children in the relief camps was 
very poor with 27.07% of them suffering from diarrhea, malaria, typhoid, worms and 
malnutrition.135 In an attempt to deal with these issues, UNICEF along with the State 
Home Department has launched the Assam Plan of Operation to focus on the problems of 
children due to insurgency and conflict. UNICEF has also proposed setting up mobile 
health units and daily health services. 
 
Education is also being disrupted by armed violence. A study in Kokrajhar province in 
Assam in 1999 found that armed violence episodes had had a serious impact on education 
due to curfews and the closure of schools for long periods of time.136 Ethnic clashes in 
Churachandpur, Manipur, in June 1997 brought education to a compete halt as many 
students had to be transferred to safer areas to prevent kidnapping or assault by warring 
tribes. This denial of access to education is compounded when children end up in refugee 
camps – they are unable to go to school and are often forced to work for their livelihood.  
 
7.2.2 Direct targeting by security forces and insurgent groups 
 
Children are not, however, just getting “caught in the crossfire” but are also being 
targeted. For example, in June 1999, Bodos abducted 14 Santhals, including nine women 
and two babies, from their village in Dhubri District, Assam. Four bodies were later 
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found, one of which was that of a six-month-old baby.137 And more recently, as referred 
to before, in November 2003, in Guwahati, Assam, separatist Karbi rebels kidnapped and 
beheaded four schoolboys, who were from the Kuki tribe.138  
 
Box 5: A child’s account of arrest and torture in Manipur 
 
“Some uniformed Indian army personnel armed with guns came to my house in about four 
vehicles including a “Shaktiman” truck.  They claimed they were from the 14 Punjab Regiment 
who were camped in Mayang Imphal Police Station.  It was around midnight of the night of 23 
August 1998 and we were sleeping. We were woken up by the soldiers in uniform, one of them 
who spoke Manipuri language asked for me.  My parents asked why and they were told that I was 
required for questioning.  By this time, some local Meira Paibi [peace activists] women had also 
gathered at our house and they tried to persuade the soldiers not to take me as I was an innocent 
boy studying in school, and moreover, undergoing treatment for frequent attacks of loss of 
consciousness.  The women were threatened and told not to interfere. My hands were tied then I 
was blindfolded and taken away.  They reached their camp and took me into a large hall inside a 
building. One man who could speak Manipuri asked me to say yes to the question whether I was a 
member of the underground. I was hit on the back of my neck and back with the butt of a rifle. 
Then they made me lie flat on my back and poured water into my nostrils many times.  They kept 
on pouring water into my nostrils until the water came out in my ears; it felt warm inside my ears.  
Then they stamped on both my thighs while two persons held my feet while another man sat on 
my head.  Then they made me hang with the ropes tied to my hands and used sticks to beat the 
soles of my feet and my buttocks.  
 
All the time, I said that I was innocent and had nothing to do with the underground.  After some 
time, a small metal box, dull green in colour was brought out.  Some electrical wire was taken out 
of this box and these were connected to a connection in the wall of the room.  One man then took 
out a short metallic rod and touched the wires with it. Sparks came out when the wires touched 
the rod.  They touched the wires’ ends to my chest and gave me shocks three times.  Each time I 
felt as if my whole body had contracted.  Each time they pulled my body straight before giving 
the shock.  They stopped beating me and putting electric shocks after some time.  They gave one 
tablet to swallow, which I vomited out immediately.  Then two Digene (antacid) tablets were also 
given to me.  They also rubbed some white ointment on my skin where they had beaten me. 
 
By this time it was morning.  They took me to a doctor in the Mayang Imphal bazaar, a private 
doctor.  He prescribed some medicines.  Then they took me to the police station where I was kept 
in a room.  My family members came to fetch me after some hours and they took me to the 
hospital. Now my body still aches, especially at my waist.  I cannot sleep properly and get up 
with nightmares.  I sleep with my father nowadays.  I feel dizzy frequently and I am very afraid 
when night comes.  I keep remembering how they used to beat me and see everything that 
happened to me vividly.” 
 
Witness statement of a 14-year-old child, reproduced from Pinto, 2002. 
 
Children are not just at risk from the violence of insurgent groups. Children and juveniles 
are routinely arrested and detained under repressive emergency laws. In Manipur, for 
example, evidence suggests that children and youths arrested by security forces are 
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subjected to torture, some even “disappear” while in custody.139 (See Box 7 below.) In 
addition, children have witnessed to their mothers being sexually abused and raped by the 
security forces.140 (See Annex 1 for a list of children killed or tortured by the security 
forces in Manipur between 1980 and 1997.) As well as the direct impact of killings and 
torture, the indirect impact of the imposition of security checks, patrols and curfews also 
have an impact on the ability of children to lead a normal life.141  
 
7.2.3 Child labour and violence in the home 
 
A report on the rights of the child conducted in Manipur in the late 1990s reports a visible 
and drastic increase in child labour due to pauperization and displacement of 
communities, although no exact figures are given. This report also claims that violence 
towards children in the family, including sexual violence, is on the increase. This, it 
argues, is due to the stress put on a family and community environment which is 
surrounded by a climate of violence. In addition, children who have been displaced from 
their communities into camps become easy targets for extremist groups and for 
trafficking to carpet factories and brothels.142 Due to displacement and communal 
tensions, many of the extended family and community networks that would normally 
intervene have disintegrated or have become biased towards community solidarity rather 
than a child’s interests.143  
 
Many of the NEI states, particularly Manipur, Nagaland, Assam and Tripura, are 
witnessing a dangerous trend of traumatized and disturbed children and youths resorting 
to heroin addition. In Manipur, for example, the largest group of recently inducted addicts 
in the past few years has been juveniles and children who are working. 144  
 
7.3 Impact on women 
 
There are three main impacts of armed violence on women in NEI: direct violence by the 
security forces and by insurgent groups; impact on livelihoods due to lack of security and 
increased violence in the home; and, more positively, the development of community 
women’s groups, such as the Meira Paibis, to oppose violence. 
 
7.3.1 Violence against women by security forces and insurgent groups 
 
Women have been raped and used as human shields by the security forces. This happens 
most often during crackdowns and cordon-and-search operations during which men are 
held for identification in parks or school years while security forces search their homes. 
For example, in 1997 in Meghalaya, many Khasi women were reportedly raped during 
“Operation Birdie”. However, the Oinam incident in Manipur in 1987, where security 
forces went on the rampage, is one of the worst human rights violation cases. For four 
                                                 
139 In Manipur, more than 10 cases of arrest of students were recorded during 1997 and 1998 alone. Nepram, 2002. 
140 Pinto, 2000. 
141 Boyden, 2002. 
142 Boyden, 2002. 
143 Pinto, 2000.  
144 Pinto, 2000. 
 28
The impact of armed violence in Northeast India, Turner & Nepram, November 2004 
months the Assam Rifles subjected the villagers to a variety of inhuman conduct. Men 
were hung upside down, buried alive and given electric shocks. Women were sexually 
assaulted and raped. And two women were even compelled to give birth to their babies in 
full view of the soldiers. In May 1998, the 27 Assam Rifles gang-raped 14 tribal women 
at Ujanmaidan in Tripura. Rape and sexual abuse by the security forces continues. In 
August 2004, a Manipuri woman was raped and murdered by security forces after they 
picked her up on suspicion of being a member of an insurgent group. In addition to sexual 
violence, women have also been used as human shields. In March 1996, provoked by an 
attack by the NSCN, the 20 Assam Rifles used women as human shields by placing the 
muzzle of their guns on the women’s shoulders. 
 
The impact of rape on women in NEI is common to that around the world. Not only does 
the victim suffer from stigmatization (in Manipur, for example, the literal meaning of the 
word “rape” is “elimination of one’s esteem”), and loss of marriage opportunities and 
thus livelihood opportunities, but there is no access to justice as the perpetrators have 
immunity under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. 
 
Several cases of rape and sexual abuse of tribal women by underground militants have 
also been reported; in some incidents, the women were killed if they resisted. In a recent 
incident, Tripura militants in the Amarpur subdivision of South Tripura district gang-
raped a young tribal girl. Later they hanged her in a tree and left her to die. In addition, 
women have been attacked for not wearing “appropriate dress”. For example, on one 
occasion, Manipuri women were “instructed” by the insurgent outfits not to wear any 
mainland Indian dress like salwar kameez or saris. Those who wore it were shot in the leg 
or in the stomach. The women were told to wear only “phaneks”, a traditional Manipuri 
dress. 
 
7.3.2 Impact on livelihoods and violence against women in the home 
 
Due to the lack of security and the systematic rape of women by the security forces, 
women tend not to work outside of daylight hours. This impacts on their livelihoods and 
has led to their further marginalization145 Furthermore, as NEI society has become more 
violent, violence against women has increased. A study which analysed the statistics on 
male/female ratios showed that in areas of greater conflict there is a more adverse sex 
ratio. For example, in Manipur, the Ukhral district has 884 women to 1,000 men, 
Bishnupur has 984 to 1,000. Ukhral is a more conflict-ridden area.146 However, this study 
may well be revealing patriarchal and repressive tendencies which may be associated 
with a greater tendency to ethnic discrimination and violence. In addition, this is against 
the background of growing drug abuse and alcoholism, which is also resulting in 
increasing violence against women. 
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7.3.3 The development of a women’s movement 
 
Despite the rise of violence against women in the northeast, they have not relegated 
themselves to mere passive victims. Although no figures exist, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many young women make up the membership of the insurgent groups.147 In 
addition, organizations have sprung up to impart combat and self-defense training to 
young housewives and girls.  
 
Meira Paibis, or Women Torch Bearers, are groups of women who emerged across 
Manipur as early as the late 1970s. Armed with cloth torches in their hands, these women 
activists launched campaigns against alcoholism and drug abuse as well as awareness 
campaigns for women to protect themselves from crime and violence. In the 1990s, these 
women, most of whom are middle-aged mothers, started to campaign against army 
atrocities and, on occasions have succeeded in preventing the army from arresting 
youths.148 The Naga Mother’s Association performs a similar role in Nagaland. 
 
Women have been coming together to face the crisis in various other ways. In November 
1998, nearly 4,000 women had a peace procession and rally in strife-torn Churachandpur 
district in Manipur calling for peace and reconciliation amongst different tribes. The 
Indian army has recently recognized the role of women’s organizations by holding public 
meetings with then and releasing guerrillas through them. 
 
8. Impact of armed violence on the economy 
 
Despite the lack of detailed information, two particular impacts of armed violence on the 
economy can be discerned in qualitative terms: 1) as a drain on resources; and 2) through 
the decline of business confidence and a flight of capital.149
 
8.1 A drain on resources 
 
A huge amount of funds are collected each year by insurgent groups through their 
systems of “taxation”; these help to boost their budgets, most of which are used to 
maintain their organisational base and to buy weapons to continue the insurgency. This 
flow of money into the underground terror economy is literally bleeding many of the NEI 
states of necessary funds for investment. For example, some commentators have 
estimated the combined annual budget of the two factions of the NSCN to be almost 
equal to the budget of the Nagaland state.150 However, the widespread collusion between 
insurgent groups and some politicians discussed in Section 5.2 emphasises the fact that 
state corruption is also a key problem. 
 
In addition, the frequent bandhs (general strikes) in some parts of the northeast against 
violence and militarisation is having an impact on the economy. For example, some 73 
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were called in Assam alone between June 1997 and May 1998, with a total loss in state 
domestic product of Rs1,255 crore (Rs12.5bn).151  
 
8.2 The decline of business confidence and the flight of capital 
 
One of the main impacts that can be attributed directly to the presence of armed insurgent 
groups is the impact of widespread extortion on business confidence and investment in 
the area. Phanjanbam (2001) identifies two categories under which he discusses the 
impact of insurgency on business and investment. The first is direct: that investors are 
dissuaded by fear of intimidation, extortion, or that the company may be caught in 
crossfire; as happened for example, with the Japan-sponsored sericulture project in 
Manipur.152 The second is indirect, or less direct: the government’s focus on counter-
insurgency rather than encouraging investments.153 In situations of armed violence, state 
resources are often redirected to achieve political goals such as stability and legitimacy. 
But funds spent for counter-insurgency operations remain beyond public scrutiny. This 
further encourages state corruption.154
 
In order to survive, almost every industry or business in most parts of NEI makes regular 
“contributions” to underground groups through extortion, ransom or protection money. 
As discussed earlier, even a company as huge and powerful as the Tatas has been 
implicated in these payments. This “insurgency tax” is the biggest disincentive to 
investment in the area.155 In addition, the relative absence of the rule of law, 
militarization and widespread corruption makes any investment in the area highly 
risky.156 In Assam, for example, it has been widely reported that insurgents have forced a 
large number of businesses and shops to flee particular areas, such as Nagaon, because of 
extortion. Even a few World Bank projects have stalled due to extortion demands – and 
kidnapping – by the ULFA.157  
 
A recent study of Nagaland showed that the private sector, which is dominated by the 
retail and wholesale trading business, does not fully invest its profit back into the country, 
but is diverted to open up business elsewhere as a fall-back if the violence increases. 
This, plus a low credit deposit ratio in the banks, indicates that large amounts of capital 
are moved out of the state.158
 
9. Impact of armed violence on health services 
 
According to a study in Assam, the areas affected by ethnic violence suffer from poor 
primary health services. It found that 70% of the sanctioned doctors in the two districts of 
Kokrajhar and Bongaigoan are absent and none are ready to work in the trouble-torn 
                                                 
151 Sachdeva, 2000, p217-224. 
152 Phanjanbam, 2001, p19-21. 
153 Phanjanbam, 2001, p19-21. 
154 Das, 2002, p33. 
155 Sachdeva, 2000, p225-6. 
156 Das, 2002, p32. 
157 Maitra, 2002, p72-74. 
158 Das, 2002, p32. 
 31
The impact of armed violence in Northeast India, Turner & Nepram, November 2004 
areas fearing risk to their lives. Many public health centers have been abandoned and 
some converted into security outposts.159 Bandhs and economic blockages also mean that 
vital stocks of drugs are not replenished.160 The disruption to health services is further 
compounded by military action against the insurgents. For example, in Manipur, after the 
recent popular demonstrations, curfews, which were imposed for 24-hours a day for the 
first 7 days, disrupted the battle against HIV/AIDS due to the break in the continuity of 
needle exchange. Given that HIV infection amongst intravenous drug users in Manipur 
rose from 25% in 1994 to 61% in 1997, such disruptions in medical care will have a 
dramatic impact on the fight to contain the spread of HIV/AIDS.161  
 
10. Conclusion 
 
10.1 Can poverty processes and impacts be attributed to SALW? 
 
It is difficult to disaggregate the impact of armed violence on poverty and development 
from the impact of uneven development in general in NEI. In fact, many academics and 
commentators say that there is a symbiotic relationship between the two: they both feed 
off each other. For example, most of the hill districts of Manipur, which are strongholds 
of insurgents, are reeling under acute poverty. However, this is mainly due to the under-
utilization of their natural resources due to lack of infrastructure. In Chandel district, over 
64% of the people live below the poverty line while in Churachandpur, Ukhrul and 
Tamenglong districts, it is between 51 and 55%.162 The national rural average for India 
was 30.2% in 2000.163  
 
Poverty in NEI certainly cannot be directly attributed to the availability and use of 
SALW.  However, what can be said is that the easy availability of SALW is helping to 
fuel the proliferation of armed groups and the strength of impact that they can made. 
However, merely extracting SALW from the equation will not be enough to reduce the 
levels of violence and discontent in the region. For example, the Khasi’s  ‘poison arrows’ 
were reportedly used to kill non-tribals in the violence in rioting in Shillong in 1992. 
 
10.2 Issues for future consideration 
 
While DFID is not involved in development work in NEI, there are a number of issues 
that need to be addressed for armed violence to be reduced in the region. 
 
• Insurgency in NEI has strong roots in the land issue, large-scale unemployment of 
educated youth, and concerns over identity and culture. All this is exacerbated by the 
GOI’s ignorance of the issues and its counterinsurgency operations. 
• The GOI’s preoccupation with law and order in the NEI states has tended to deepen 
those states’ alienation from Delhi. While rehabilitation packages for ex-insurgents 
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are a good idea and should be built upon,164 the key to a more stable future lies in a 
better mix of Indian policies towards economic development, focusing especially on 
the region’s energy resources; greater tolerance for local control; willingness to work 
with local leaders; and strengthening democracy and civil society.165 Confidence-
building measures need to be at the forefront. In an attempt to bridge the yawing gap 
between the perceptions of the policymakers at Delhi and the aspirations of people in 
NEI the GOI has drawn up a 52-point national strategy. Some of the proposals 
include: 
o At least 25% of all Plan funds being released by the GOI to the NEI states 
should go directly to the district councils or panchayats. 
o Each year, 1,000 youths from NEI are to be provided with vocational training 
with 5-year scholarship in institutions outside NEI. 
o Rs500m per annum is to be made available for developing infrastructure for 
agricultural marketing and strengthening of NERAMAC, the North Eastern 
Regional Agricultural Marketing Corporation. 
o New information technology centres to be opened in NEI 
o A Central Forest Protection Force to be set up for the protection of forest 
areas. 
o NEI politicians to be given prominent position at national-level committees, 
boards etc. 
o Conscious efforts to be made to increase the exposure of Mongoloid northeast 
people on Doordarshan and other TV channels, by appointment as 
announcers, news readers and for advertisements. 
• The most vulnerable group in NEI in terms of poverty, insecurity and poor health are 
the internally displaced. Their well-being and rehabilitation should not be left to NEI 
regional states. By not taking steps to rehabilitate the IDPs the GOI is condemning 
them to a life dependent on handouts with no livelihood options. The GOI should 
develop an assistance strategy and should allow international observers and NGOs 
such as UNHCR access to refugees and IDPs in the region.  
• Some of the community-based organizations, such as the Naga People’s  Movement 
for Human Rights (NPMHR), the Naga Students’ Federation, tribal organization such 
as the Naga Hohos, and churches have been working for a peaceful solution. Some 
have even had meetings with the NSCN-K. The GOI should be willing to work with 
some of these groups to achieve a sustainable peace in the region. 
• The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) could play a key 
role by offering practical areas of cooperation, such as the exchange of information, 
intelligence and expertise among the security agencies in the region. An Arms 
Register should be maintained at the state and region level in order to monitor the 
kind of small arms found in the region. 
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Appendix 1: The militarization of Manipur society: location of camps and stations  
 
1. Mantripukhri, HQ. 12 Assam Rifle.  
2. Lamshang, Out-post 12 Assam Rifle.  
3. Keithelmanbi (West), Out-post 12 Assam Rifle.  
4. Kangla (Imphal), HQ. 17 Assam Rifle.  
5. Chinga (Imphal), Out-post 17 Assam Rifle.  
6. Kanchipur (Imphal), Out-post 17 Assam Rifle.  
7. Kumbi, Out-post 17 Assam Rifle.  
8. Sharam, Out-post 17 Assam Rifle.  
9. Koireng-gei, HQ. 21 Assam Rifle.  
10. Saikul, HQ. 24 Assam Rifle.  
11. Kangla (Imphal), HQ. 30 Assam Rifle.  
12. Chingarel, Out-post 30 Assam Rifle.  
13. Koireng-gei, HQ. 112 BSF (Border Security Force).  
14. Kotland, HQ. 12 CRPF (Central Reserved Police Force).  
15. Lamphel, HQ. 81. CRPF (Central Reserved Police 
Force).  
16. Yurenjam, HQ. 77 CRPF (Central Reserved Police 
Force).  
17. Dolaithabi, HQ. 133  
18. Sawombung, HQ. IRB (Indian Reserved Battalion).  
19. Motbung, Out-post 21 Assam Rifle.  
20. Tulihal Airport, HQ. 14 Punjab Regiment.  
21. Churachandpur (CCpur), HQ. 23 CRPF 
23. Tuinom, Out-post 23 CRPF  
24. Sagang, Out-post 23 CRPF  
25. Moirang, HQ. 46 CRPF (Central Reserved Police Force).  
26. Bishenpur, HQ. 52 CRPF (Central Reserved Police 
Force).  
27. Kangvai, HQ. 96 CRPF (Central Reserved Police Force).  
28. Jiribam, HQ. 317 Field Regiment.  
29. Bishenpur, HQ. 1 Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry.  
30. Kumbi, Out-post 1Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry.  
31. Moirang. HQ. 8 Mahar Regiment.  
32. CCpur, HQ. 8 Madras Regiment.  
33. Jiribam, Out-post 16 Sikh Regiment.  
34. Maibam Lotpa Ching, Out-post 8 Assam Rifle.  
35. CCpur, HQ. 18 Rashtriya Rifle.  
36. Bishenpur, HQ. 8 Assam Rifle. Battalion.  
37. Bishenpur, HQ. 16 Sikh Infantry.  
38. Nungba, Out-post 16 Sikh Regiment.  
39. Thoubal, HQ. 7 Assam Rifle.  
40. Moreh, Out-post 3 Assam Rifle.  
41. Sagang, Out-post 23  
42. Wangjing, HQ. 35 CRPF (Central Reserved Police 
Force).  
43. Moreh, Out-post 55 BSF (Border security Force).  
44. Wabagai, HQ. 5/5 GR (Gurkha Regiment).  
45. Sugnu, HQ. 10 Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry.  
46. Konkhang, Out-post 55 BSF (Border Security Force).  
47. Yairipok, HQ. Rajputana Rifle & Out-post 7 Assam 
Rifle.  
48. Tengnoupal, HQ. 15 Raj Rifle.  
49. Chasad, HQ. 4 Assam Rifle.  
50. Chasad, Out-post 3 Assam Rifle.  
51. Ukhrul, HQ. 20 Assam Rifle.  
52. Maram, HQ. 3 Assam Rifle.  
53. Thenjang, HQ. 5 Assam Rifle.  
54. Kangpokpi, Out-post 21 Assam Rifle.  
55.            Tamei, HQ. 31 Assam Rifle. 
56. Nilakuthi, HQ. 17 Raj Rifle. 
 
 
57. Napet Palli, HQ. 65 CRPF          
58. Chingarel, Out-post 7 Assam Rifle.  
59. Sawombung, Out-post 65 CRPF   
60. Sagolmang, Out-post 65 CRPF  
61. Yaingangpokpi, Out-post 12 Assam Rifle.  
62. Lital, Out-post 25 Assam Rifle.  
63. Ukhrul, HQ. 25 Assam Rifle.  
64. Leimakhong, 9 Sector, Battalion HQ. 21 Assam 
Rifle.  
65. Senapati, 21 Assam Rifle.  
66. Pallel, 55 Battalion HQ. BSF (Border Security 
Force).  
67. CCpur, 163 BSF (Border Security Force).  
68. Toloi, 6/5 GR (Gurkha Regiment).  
69. Jessami, Out-post 25 Assam Rifle.  
70. Lamlai, Out-post 20 Assam Rifle.  
71. Sanshak, HQ. 25 Assam Rifle.  
72. Rongmal, Out-post 81  
73. Mayang Imphal, Out-post 14 Punjab Regiment.  
74. Wang-goi, Out-post 14 Punjab Regiment.  
75. Kangla, Out-post 14 Punjab Regiment.  
76. Keirak, Out-post 5/5 Gurkha Regiment.  
77. Khongjom, Out-post 5/5 Gurkha Regiment.  
78. Chandel, Out-post 10 Jammu and Kashmir Light 
Infantry.  
79. Sharam, Out-post 17 Rajputana Rifle.  
80. Lilong, Out-post 7 Assam Rifle.  
81. Andro, Out-post 17 Rajputana Rifle.  
82. Chingmeirong, Out-post 12 Assam Rifle.  
83. Yurembam, Out-post 12 Assam Rifle.  
84. Kakching Lamkhei, Out-post 7 Assam Rifle.  
85. Kakching, Coy HQ. 85 SSB.  
86. Bongyang, 55 Battalion BSF 1 Coy.  
87. Pheishangjang, 3 Assam Rifle 1 Coy.  
88. Moreh Haokip Veng, 3 Assam Rifle 1 Coy.  
89. Ningthoukhong, Out-post 8 Assam Rifle.  
90. Henbung & Mayang-khang, 21 Assam Rifle 1 
Coy.  
91. Senapati, Out-post 21 Assam Rifle.  
92. Lairouching, Out-post 21 Assam Rifle.  
93. Karong, Out-post VVF (Village Volunteer 
Force)  
94. Shokvao, Out-post 25 Assam Rifle.  
95. Phungyar, Out-post 25 Assam Rifle.  
96. Ukhrul, DIG "B" Range Assam Rifle HQ.  
97. Nungbi, Out-post 20 Assam Rifle.  
98. Paoyi, Out-post 20 Assam Rifle.  
99. Hungdung, SSB/VVF AS. HQ.  
100. Chasad, Out-post SSB/VVF.  
101. Kharasom, Out-post SSB/VVF.  
102. Shangsat, Out-post SSB/VVF.  
103. Phungyar, Out-post SSB/VVF.  
104. Shirakhong 25 Assam Rifle 1Coy.  
105. Langjing, CRPF Group Center.  
106. Lokchao, Out-post 93 CRPF.  
107. Lamphel, HQ. 93 CRPF.  
108. Senapati, 63 HQ. CRPF.  
109. Nungba, Out-Post 63 CRPF.  
110. Keimai, Out-post 63 CRPF.  
111. None, Out-post 63 CRPF.  
112. Tamenglong, Out-post 63  
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Appendix 2: internally displaced persons in Northeast India166
                                                 
166 Reproduced from USCR, 2000, by kind permission of the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. 
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